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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 8, 2001, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft an-
nounced that "[d]efending our nation and defending the citizens of
America against terrorist attacks is now [the Department of Justice's]
first and overriding priority."1 Ashcroft explained that the Depart-
ment of Justice would "arrest and detain any suspected terrorist who
has violated our laws. "2 However, under the new strategy, "[s]uspects
without links to terrorism or who are not guilty of violations of the law
will not be detained."3 Ashcroft reallocated the Department's re-
sources to execute the prosecutorial strategy.4
Generally, courts do not interfere with such prosecutorial strate-
gies. 5 The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that "[t]he Attorney
General and the United States Attorneys retain 'broad discretion' to
enforce the Nation's criminal laws."6 Under this tradition, courts
"'presume that [prosecutors] have properly discharged their official
duties"' 7 absent "'clear evidence to the contrary . *..."'8 However,
prosecutors' strategies and decisions are also "'subject to constitu-
tional constraints."' 9 The U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection princi-
ples demand that a prosecutor's "'decision whether to prosecute may
not be based on an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or
other arbitrary classification.' "10
1. John Ashcroft, U.S. Att'y Gen., Attorney General Ashcroft and Deputy Attorney
General Thompson Announce Reorganization and Mobilization of the Nation's
Justice and Law Enforcement Resources (Nov. 8, 2001), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarksll08.htm. See Michael Ed-
mund O'Neill, When Prosecutors Don't: Trends In Federal Prosecutorial Deci-
sions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 221 (2003).
2. Ashcroft, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. In the past, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy adopted a similar strategy to
target organized crime syndicates. Id. Under Kennedy's strategy, "[tlhe Justice
Department ... would arrest a mobster for spitting on the sidewalk if it would
help in the fight against organized crime." Id.
5. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996).
6. Id. (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)).
7. Id. (quoting United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)).
8. Id. at 465 (quoting Chem. Found., 272 U.S. at 14-15).
9. Id. at 464 (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979)).
10. Id. at 465 (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)).
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If a prosecutor prosecutes a defendant based on such arbitrary
classifications, the defendant may raise the selective prosecution de-
fense under the Equal Protection principles of the U.S. Constitution."
The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the validity of the selective
prosecution defense over one hundred years ago. 12 Since that time,
the Court has continuously narrowed the defense's application. 13 As a
result, the standard for proving the elements of a selective prosecution
defense is now "a demanding one."14 Defendants seeking discovery to
help prove the validity of their selective prosecution defenses also face
a "correspondingly rigorous" discovery standard.15
In 2006 the Fourth Circuit determined whether the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia erred when it denied three
Islamic defendants' discovery request for their selective prosecution
defense.16 The district court convicted the defendants of various
crimes relating to their ties to an Islamic terrorist organization. 17 The
defendants claimed that the Government failed to prosecute non-Mus-
lim individuals in the United States who engaged in similar criminal
conduct.1s Furthermore, the defendants claimed that the Govern-
ment prosecuted them because they were Muslims in a post-9/11
world.19 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to
deny the defendants' discovery request. 20
To fully understand Khan's contribution to selective prosecution
jurisprudence, one must first review the history of the selective prose-
cution defense and the facts and procedural history of Khan. There-
fore, Part II of this Note provides an in-depth background of the
selective prosecution defense and the facts and procedural history of
Khan. Then, Part III analyzes the Fourth Circuit's application of the
U.S. Supreme Court's selective prosecution discovery standard in
Khan. Please notice that this Note does not challenge the Fourth Cir-
cuit's ultimate decision to deny the Khan defendants' discovery re-
quest. However, it is important to recognize that ends do not always
justify means. Courts may come to correct conclusions through incor-
rect applications of law or logic. The author proposes that the Fourth
Circuit correctly denied the defendants' discovery request, but did so
11. "A selective-prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits to the criminal
charge itself, but an independent assertion that the prosecutor has brought the
charge for reasons forbidden by the Constitution." Id. at 463.
12. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
13. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463-67 (discussing history of the selective prosecution
defense).
14. Id. at 463.
15. Id. at 468.
16. United State v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477 (4th Cir. 2006).
17. See id. at 487-90.
18. See id. at 497-98.
19. See id.
20. Id. at 498.
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through a questionable application of the U.S. Supreme Court's dis-
covery standard for selective prosecution claims. As a result, courts
following Khan on this issue may bar future defendants with legiti-
mate selective prosecution claims from obtaining discovery.
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
A. Brief History of Equal Protection Principles
The selective prosecution defense is rooted in the Equal Protection
principles of the U.S. Constitution's Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.2 1 Therefore, this section provides a brief background of those
principles.
In 1776, the Declaration of Independence proclaimed "that all men
are created equal" and that "Governments are instituted among Men"
to protect and reinforce such equality.2 2 The Declaration of Indepen-
dence also declared that citizens may alter or overthrow their govern-
ment if the government fails to protect equality and other inalienable
rights.2 3 However, the U.S. Constitution did not explicitly provide for
the equal protection of laws until the States ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment on July 21, 1868.24 In the meantime, slavery-an ugly
institution based on principles of inherent inequality-flourished in
the United States.
The Fourteenth Amendment declared that "[nio State shall ...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."25 The U.S. Supreme Court later determined that this "Equal
Protection Clause" prevents state prosecutors from prosecuting "based
upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbi-
trary classification."26
21. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996); Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1982).
22. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
23. Id. ("But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the
same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their
right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards
for their future security.").
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. For a detailed discussion regarding the unorthodox
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Douglas H. Bryant, Unorthodox and
Paradox: Revisiting the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 53 ALA. L.
REV. 555 (2001-2002).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
26. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). The Court in Yick Wo ruled that such
invidious prosecution mimicked slavery. The Court explained:
For the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the
means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life,
at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where
freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (emphasis added).
2008]
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Although the Fourteenth Amendment contains an explicit Equal
Protection Clause, no such clause exists on the face of the Fifth
Amendment.2 7 However, the U.S. Supreme Court's "'approach to
Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has . . . been precisely the
same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."' 28 Therefore, the Fifth Amendment prohibits federal prosecu-
tors from prosecuting based on arbitrary classifications.
B. History of the Selective Prosecution Defense
1. Development of the Selective Prosecution Defense in the U.S.
Supreme Court
In 1886, the U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the validity of the
selective prosecution defense in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.2 9 In Yick Wo, two
Chinese subjects alleged that their prosecution and imprisonment
under San Francisco city and county ordinances violated the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.30 The ordinances pro-
hibited the operation of laundries in wooden buildings in San
Francisco city and county limits without the consent of the county's
board of supervisors. 3 1 The defendants applied to the county board to
operate their laundries in wooden buildings.32 However, the board de-
nied their applications.33 Despite the board's denial, the defendants
continued to operate their laundries in wooden buildings. 3 4 The de-
fendants were subsequently arrested, convicted, and imprisoned for
violating the ordinance.35 The defendants appealed their convictions
and the case eventually came before the U.S. Supreme Court.36
Before the U.S. Supreme Court, the defendants showed that the
county board denied the laundry permits of all other similarly situ-
27. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
28. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 n.9 (1982) (quoting Weinberger v. Wie-
senfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975)). See also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
500 (1954) (considering the constitutionality of segregation under the Fifth
Amendment, the Court ruled: "In view of our decision that the Constitution pro-
hibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be
unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Fed-
eral Government.") (citing Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 68 (1948)).
29. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Though the term "selective prosecution" does not appear in
Yick Wo, the case is the first to recognize that discriminatory prosecution violates
constitutional rights. See Yelina Kvurt, Selective Prosecution In Russia-Myth or
Reality?, 15 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 127, 142 (2007).
30. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 356-358.
31. Id. at 357.
32. Id. at 358-59, 361.
33. Id. at 358, 361.
34. Id. at 359, 361.
35. Id. at 357, 361. The case was tried in the "Police Judges Court" of San Francisco
city and county. Id. at 357.
36. Id. at 356.
[Vol. 87:538
SELECTIVE PROSECUTION
ated Chinese applicants.3 7 The defendants also showed that the
board approved nearly all non-Chinese applications.38 After review-
ing this evidence, the Court ruled that "[tihough the law itself be fair
on its face . . . if it is applied and administered by public authority
with an evil eye and an unequal hand... the denial of equal justice is
still within the prohibition of the constitution."39 Therefore, the Court
held that the board's discriminatory application of the substantively
constitutional ordinance violated the Equal Protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.40 Accordingly, the Court ordered the de-
fendants' discharge from imprisonment.4 1 The Court's ruling in Yick
Wo placed prosecutors on notice that they could not unequally enforce
state laws with an "evil eye."4 2
In 1905, a Chinese subject challenged the constitutionality of his
prosecution under a different San Francisco ordinance in Ah Sin v.
Wittman.4 3 The ordinance prohibited persons from placing gambling
apparatuses in "barred or barricaded house[s] . . . to make it difficult
of access or ingress to police officers."44 As in Yick Wo, the U.S. Su-
preme Court first ruled that the ordinance did not substantively vio-
late the Constitution because the regulation of gambling was within
the scope of the state's police powers. 4 5
The Court then determined whether the prosecutor's enforcement
of the statute was unconstitutional. The Court explained that the de-
fendants in Yick Wo were successful because they provided evidence
that government officials treated Chinese individuals differently than
non-Chinese individuals under the same ordinance.4 6 However, the
defendant in Ah Sin did not provide evidence that Chinese subjects
were treated differently than non-Chinese citizens under the gam-
bling ordinance. 47 Therefore, the Court ruled that the defendant's
prosecution under the gambling ordinance was procedurally constitu-
tional.48 Since Ah Sin, courts have required defendants wishing to
37. Id. at 359. For modern definitions of "similarly situated," see infra subsection
II.B.2.
38. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 359. The board denied one non-Chinese applicant's applica-
tion. Id.
39. Id. at 373-74.
40. Id. at 374.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 373.
43. 198 U.S. 500 (1905).
44. Id. at 505.
45. Id. at 505-06.
46. Id. at 507.
47. See id. at 507-08 (stating that selective prosecution claims are "a matter of proof;
and no fact should be omitted to make it out completely, when the power of a
Federal court is invoked to interfere with the course of criminal justice of a
state").
48. Id. at 508.
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successfully invoke the selective prosecution defense to provide evi-
dence that the Government treated other similarly situated individu-
als differently under the same statute.
49
In 1962, the U.S. Supreme Court further defined the selective pros-
ecution defense in Oyler v. Boles.50 In Oyler, two prisoners invoked
selective prosecution defenses to challenge their respective life
sentences under West Virginia's habitual criminal statute. 5 1 The de-
fendants alleged that the state neglected to prosecute other eligible
habitual criminals under the statute.5 2 To satisfy Ah Sin, the defend-
ants provided statistics demonstrating the state's inconsistent prose-
cution of habitual criminals.5 3
The Court held that the prisoners did not have a valid selective
prosecution defense despite their statistical evidence.5 4 The Court ex-
plained that "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement
is not in itself a federal constitutional violation."55 The Court ruled
that selective prosecution is unconstitutional only if it is based on "an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classi-
fication."5 6 The Oyler defendants failed to provide evidence of such
invidious prosecution.Dr Since Oyler, courts have required defendants
invoking selective prosecution defenses to show that the government
prosecuted them because of their race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification.5 8
In 1985 in Wayte v. United States,59 the Court incorporated Yick
Wo, Ah Sin, and Oyler into a two-pronged selective prosecution test.
60
49. See Bonita R. Gardner, Separate and Unequal: Federal Tough-On-Guns Program
Targets Minority Communities for Selective Enforcement, 12 MICH J. RACE & L.
305, 320 (2007); Melissa L. Jampol, Note, Goodbye to the Defense of Selective
Prosecution, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 932, 934 (1997); Marc Michael, Note,
United States v. Armstrong: Selective Prosecution-A Futile Defense and Its Ar-
duous Standard of Discovery, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 675, 685-86 (1998).
50. 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
51. See W. VA. CODE § 6130 (1961). Under the statute, criminals receive mandatory
life sentences upon their third conviction "'of a crime punishable by confinement
in a penitentiary.'" Oyler, 368 U.S. at 449 (quoting W. VA. CODE § 6130 (1961)).
52. Oyler, 368 U.S. at 449.
53. Id. at 455-56.
54. Id. at 456.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996); Robert Heller, Selec-
tive Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal Law: The Need for Meaning-
ful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1317-18
(1997).
59. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
60. See Jampol, supra note 49, at 935; Kristin E. Kruse, Proving Discriminatory In-
tent in Selective Prosecution Challenges-An Alternative Approach to United
States v. Armstrong, 58 SMU L. REV. 1523, 1530-31 (2005); Michael, supra note
49, at 689-93.
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The Court ruled that defendants invoking the defense had to show
that the Government's prosecution "had a discriminatory effect and
that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose."61 To show dis-
criminatory effect, defendants must show that the Government failed
to prosecute other "similarly situated individuals" under the same
statute. 62 To show discriminatory purpose, defendants must show
that the Government prosecuted them because of their race, religion,
or other arbitrary classification.63
Though the Wayte majority clearly articulated the elements of the
selective prosecution defense, it left the nature of the defense's discov-
ery standard for a future court to decide. 6 4 However, Justice Marshall
proposed a selective prosecution discovery standard in his dissenting
opinion. 6 5 Acknowledging the heavy burden defendants must over-
come to succeed on the merits of a selective prosecution defense, Mar-
shall proposed that "a defendant need not meet this high burden just
to get discovery; the standard for discovery is merely nonfrivolous-
ness." 6 6 Under Marshall's "nonfrivolous" standard a defendant would
only need to "allege sufficient facts in support of his selective prosecu-
tion claim 'to take the question past the frivolous state."'67 In other
words, a defendant would only need to present "'some evidence tend-
ing to show the existence of the essential elements of the defense."' 68
Despite Marshall's dissent in Wayte, the U.S. Supreme Court did
not adopt a specific discovery standard for selective prosecution de-
fenses until it decided United States v. Armstrong6 9 in 1996. In Arm-
strong, the Court implicitly rejected Marshall's "nonfrivolous"
standard. The Court reasoned that granting discovery for selective
prosecution defenses "divert[s] prosecutors' resources and may dis-
close the Government's prosecutorial strategy."7 0 Therefore, the
Court adopted a "rigorous" discovery standard for selective prosecu-
tion defenses.71 Now, under Armstrong, defendants must make a
61. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608 (emphasis added).
62. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465; Michael, supra note 49, at 689-93. This prong
incorporates theAh Sin ruling. See Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500, 507 (1905).
Furthermore, this prong seems to correlate with what the Yick Wo court called an
"unequal hand." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
63. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 610; Michael, supra note 49, at 689-93. This prong clearly
incorporates Oyler. See Oyler, 368 U.S. at 449. Furthermore, this prong seems to
correlate with what the Yick Wo court called an "evil eye." 118 U.S. at 373-74.
64. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456.
65. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 614-31.
66. Id. at 625 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 623-24 (quoting United States v. Hazel, 696 F.2d 473, 475 (6th Cir. 1983)).
68. Id. at 624 (quoting United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974)).
69. 517 U.S. 456.
70. Id. at 468.
71. Id.
2008]
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"credible showing" of discriminatory effect and purpose to obtain
discovery.
7 2
Legal scholars have both praised and cursed the rigorous Arm-
strong discovery standard.73 The Armstrong discovery standard al-
lows prosecutors to effectively allocate resources, develop effective
prosecutorial strategies, and exercise legitimate prosecutorial discre-
tion.74 A more lenient discovery standard could potentially overbur-
den prosecutors, requiring them to spend valuable resources
addressing weak selective prosecution defenses that would ultimately
fail. 75 However, some have argued that the rigorous Armstrong stan-
dard "fails to take into account that, prior to discovery, defendants
generally do not have access to the type of information that would en-
able them to make the credible showing threshold."76
The application of the selective prosecution defense has clearly
narrowed a great deal since the Court first recognized the validity of
the defense in Yick Wo.77 To obtain discovery for the defense, a defen-
dant must first satisfy the rigorous Armstrong discovery standard.
First, the defendant must make a credible showing that the Govern-
ment failed to prosecute other "similarly situated individuals" under
the same statute.78 Then, the defendant must make a credible show-
ing that the Government prosecuted him because of his race, religion,
or other arbitrary classification.79 If the defendant passes the rigor-
ous Armstrong discovery standard, he must then pass the Wayte two-
pronged selective prosecution test to successfully defend against his
charge(s).80 To satisfy Wayte, the defendant must provide "'clear evi-
72. Id. at 470; see also United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 565 (E.D. Va.
2002) (explaining and applying Armstrong discovery standard); Liam D. Scully,
Comment, Defendants Must Make a Credible Showing of Selective Prosecution in
Order to Obtain Discovery: United States v. Armstrong, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
553, 560 (1997) (describing Armstrong "credible showing" discovery standard).
73. See Jampol, supra note 49, at 954-65 (criticizing the Armstrong discovery stan-
dard); Michael, supra note 49, at 716-17 (criticizing the Armstrong court for not
adequately defining "similarly situated"); Scully, supra note 72, at 559-60 (dis-
cussing the Armstrong discovery standard's pros and cons).
74. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 468; Scully, supra note 72, at 558-59.
75. See Scully, supra note 72, at 559.
76. Id. at 560 (citing Amy Grossman Applegate, Prosecutorial Discretion and Dis-
crimination in the Decision to Charge, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 35, 53 (1982)). See generally
Jampol, supra note 49 (advocating Marshall's more liberal discovery standard in
Wayte and criticizing the Armstrong standard).
77. In fact, "[nlo defendant since Yick Wo in 1886 has been successful in proving a
race-based claim of selective prosecution." Jampol, supra note 49, at 965.
78. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 469.
79. See Scully, supra note 72, at 560 (discussing Armstrong where the Court provided
that "discovery would only be appropriate after defendants make a 'credible
showing' of both elements of selective prosecution.")
80. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1982).
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dence"'"1 that the Government failed to prosecute other similarly situ-
ated individuals under the same statute.8 2 Then, the defendant must
provide clear evidence that the Government prosecuted him because
of his race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.8
3
2. Undecided Definition of "Similarly Situated" Individual
As discussed in the preceding section, the Armstrong discovery
standard first requires defendants to make a credible showing that
the Government failed to prosecute other "similarly situated" individ-
uals.84 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has not defined "similarly
situated."8 5 In the absence of such a ruling, the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals have adopted varying definitions of the phrase.
In United States v. Olvis,8 6 the Fourth Circuit ruled that "defend-
ants are similarly situated when their circumstances present no dis-
tinguishable legitimate prosecutorial factors that might justify
making different prosecutorial decisions with respect to them."87 Sev-
eral other Circuits have adopted the same or similarly narrow defini-
tions.8 8 The First Circuit, however, has provided an arguably more
flexible definition for general Equal Protection cases. To determine
whether individuals are similarly situated, the First Circuit deter-
mines "whether an objective person would see two people similarly sit-
uated based upon the incident and context in question."89 This
81. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (quoting United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272
U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)).
82. See id.
83. Id. at 464.
84. See discussion supra subsection II.B.1.
85. In a recent U.S. Supreme Court selective prosecution case, the Court denied a
defendant discovery for his selective prosecution defense because he failed to
show that the Government failed to prosecute other "similarly situated" individu-
als. See United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862 (2002). Still, the Court failed to
define "similarly situated" in its analysis.
86. 97 F.3d 739 (4th Cir. 1996).
87. Id. at 744 (emphasis added).
88. See Skehan v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 465 F.3d 96, 110 (2d Cir. 2006) (adopting a
similar definition); United States v. Deberry, 430 F.3d 1294, 1301 (10th Cir.
2005) (adopting the Fourth Circuit definition); Racine Charter One, Inc. v. Racine
Unified Sch. Dist., 424 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 2005) ("To be considered 'similarly
situated,' comparators must be 'prima facie identical in all relevant respects'
... .") (quoting Purze v. Vill. of Winthrop Harbor, 286 F.3d 452, 455-56 (7th Cir.
2004)).
89. Marrero-Gutierrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007). In a previous ruling,
the First Circuit articulated the test in a slightly different way: "[t]he test is
whether a prudent person, looking objectively at the incidents, would think them
roughly equivalent and the protagonists similarly situated." Tapalian v. Tusino,
377 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Barrington Cove Ltd. P'ship v. R.I. Hous.
and Mortgage Fin. Corp., 246 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2001)). After this Note was sub-
mitted for publication, the First Circuit decided United States v. Lewis, 517 F.3d
20 (1st Cir. 2008) in which an African-American Muslim defendant with alleged
2008]
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"objective person" test focuses on "factual elements which determine
whether reasoned analogy supports, or demands, a like result."90 The
test does not require "'[e]xact correlation.., but the cases must be fair
congeners."' 9 1 Such definitions have a profound impact on the Arm-
strong discovery standard. The degree of the Armstrong discovery
standard's stringency depends on whether courts adopt a flexible or
narrow "similarly situated" definition.92
3. Islamic Faith-Based Selective Prosecution Cases
After the September 11th attacks, several defendants attempted to
use the selective prosecution defense to defend against terror-related
charges. 93 Two such cases are included in this subsection. The cases
discussed below are relevant because they provide contemporary ex-
amples of courts' application of the Armstrong discovery standard and
the Wayte two-pronged selective prosecution test. The cases also
share striking factual similarities with Khan. In all three cases, de-
fendants with ties to Islamic terror organizations alleged in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia that the U.S. Gov-
ernment selectively prosecuted them because they were Muslims in a
post-9/11 world.9 4
In United States v. Lindh95, the Government charged John Phillip
Walker Lindh with conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals, conspiracy to
contribute services to the Taliban, and various federal weapons viola-
tions.96 Lindh, an American citizen, joined al-Qaeda and Taliban
forces in Afghanistan to fight against American forces in 2001.97
terrorist ties was denied discovery for his selective prosecution defense. When it
applied the Armstrong discriminatory effect prong, the court explained: "Al-
though we have not previously provided a distinct definition of the term 'similarly
situated' in the selective prosecution context, classical equal protection principles
light our path and limn the attributes of one who is similarly situated." Id. at 27.
Suprisingly, the court did not look to Molina or Tapalian for a definition of "simi-
larly situated." Rather, the court applied a more stringent definition, apparently
specific to the selective prosecution defense, and even cited the Fourth Circuit's
definition in Olvis for support. Id. at 27-28. Thus, when the author refers to the
First Circuit's definition of"similarly situated," he is referring to the more lenient
"objective person" standard articulated in Molina and Tapalian.
90. Tapalian, 377 F.3d at 6 (quoting Barrington Cove, 246 F.3d at 8).
91. Id. (quoting Barrington Cove, 246 F.3d at 8).
92. See discussion infra subsection III.B.2.
93. See United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Awan,
459 F. Supp. 2d 167 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); United States v. Biheiri, 341 F. Supp. 2d
593 (E.D. Va. 2004); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002).
94. For a similar case from the Eastern District of New York, see Awan, 459 F. Supp.
2d 167.
95. 212 F. Supp. 2d 541.
96. Id. at 547.
97. Id. at 546.
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American forces captured Lindh and his fellow soldiers in December
2001.98
Lindh argued before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia that the court should dismiss the Government's
charges because "he [was] the victim of impermissible selective prose-
cution" under the Fifth Amendment. 9 9 Specifically, Lindh argued
that the Government selectively prosecuted him because he exercised
his First Amendment rights and associated with the Taliban for relig-
ious purposes.100 Lindh sought discovery to help prove the validity of
his claim.1O1 Therefore, the court employed the Armstrong discovery
standard to determine whether Lindh provided sufficient evidence of
discriminatory effect and purpose to obtain discovery.
10 2
Under the discriminatory effect prong of the Armstrong test, the
court analyzed whether Lindh had made a credible showing that the
Government neglected to prosecute other similarly situated persons
for the same offenses 103 Lindh provided evidence that the Govern-
ment did not prosecute other entities who contributed services to the
Taliban for non-religious purposes.1 0 4 Lindh cited the University of
Nebraska at Omaha ("UNO") among such entities.1o 5 Lindh provided
evidence that UNO had received money from another entity to fund
visits by Taliban members to the United States prior to the September
11th attacks.1O6
To determine whether Lindh and the entities were "similarly situ-
ated," the court applied the Fourth Circuit's definition of the term.
10 7
The court determined that the entities were not similarly situated
with Lindh because they provided non-military services to the
Taliban.10 8 Therefore, the court determined that Lindh had not made
a credible showing of discriminatory effect under the Armstrong dis-
covery standard.1 0 9
Although Lindh's failure under the first prong of the Armstrong
test was sufficient to deny discovery, the court analyzed Lindh's evi-
dence under the discriminatory purpose prong of the Armstrong
test.110 To succeed under this prong, Lindh had to show that the Gov-
98. Id. at 547.
99. Id. at 564.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 565.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 565-66.
105. Id. at 566 n.62.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 566. See United States v. Olvis, 97 F.3d 739, 744 (4th Cir. 1996).
108. See Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d. at 566-67.
109. Id. at 568.
110. Id. at 567.
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ernment prosecuted him because he was exercising his Islamic faith.
Lindh argued that the Government's complaint, which chronicled
Lindh's religious history, was evidence of the Government's discrimi-
natory purpose."' However, the court determined that such informa-
tion merely explained the extent of Lindh's relationship with the
Taliban.112 The court ruled that "[d]iscriminatory purpose cannot be
inferred from a recitation of historical facts that merely provide con-
text for criminal charges." 1 13 The court reasoned that Lindh was
prosecuted because of the gravity of his offenses and not because of his
religion.114 Therefore, the court held that Lindh had not made a cred-
ible showing of the Government's discriminatory purpose.115 Accord-
ingly, the court denied Lindh's discovery request as he failed to satisfy
both the first and second prongs of the Armstrong discovery test.116
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia decided
United States v. Biheiri1 17 just after it decided Khan, but before Khan
reached the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals."18 In Biheiri, the Gov-
ernment charged Soliman Biheiri with two counts of making false
statements to federal agents to obstruct the investigation of terrorism
and one count of using a fraudulent passport.119 The Government
provided evidence that Biheiri had served as an investment banker for
a leader of the Islamic terrorist organization HAMAS.120 In an inter-
view with a federal agent, Biheiri denied ever knowing the HlAMAAS
leader or other terrorist leaders.121
Biheiri moved to dismiss the claims, alleging that he had been the
victim of selective prosecution.122 Biheiri claimed that the Govern-
ment had "unfairly and selectively targeted persons either of the Mus-
lim religion or of Middle Eastern descent and prosecuted them for
crimes that have not been charged against the general population."12 3
However, Biheiri made a critical mistake. The court emphasized that
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 568.
117. 341 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Va. 2004).
118. The Eastern District of Virginia decided Khan on March 4, 2004. See United
States v. Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. Va. 2004). The Fourth Circuit decided
Khan on September 1, 2006. See United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477 (4th Cir.
2006). The Eastern District of Virginia decided Biheiri on October 19, 2004. See
Biheiri, 341 F. Supp. 2d 593.
119. Biheiri, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 597-98.
120. Id. at 596. "HAMAS and [the leader] were each listed by the Department of State
as a Specially Designated Terrorist (SDT) on January 25, 1995 and August 29,
1995, respectively." Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 598.
123. Id. at 600.
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Biheiri "failed to identify even a single non-Muslim or non-Middle
Eastern individual who was not prosecuted despite having engaged in
offense conduct similar to that for which defendant has been in-
dicted." 12 4 The court ruled that such a showing is an "'absolute re-
quirement"' for selective prosecution defenses. 12 5 Therefore, the court
denied Biheiri's motion to dismiss the charges under his selective
prosecution defense.
12 6
C. United States v. Khan
1. Factual Background
On February 9, 2004, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia heard United States v. Khan.127 The U.S. Govern-
ment charged defendants Masoud Khan ("Khan"), Seifullah Chapman
("Chapman"), and Hammad Abdur-Raheem ("Hammad") with serious
crimes relating to their contact and association with Islamic terrorist
groups before and after the September 11th attacks. 128 The charges
arose out of the defendants' conduct which allegedly "constituted prep-
aration for violent jihad overseas against nations with whom the
United States was at peace and providing material support to terrorist
organizations." 12 9 The defendants argued that the Government selec-
tively prosecuted them because they were Muslims in a post-9/11
world. 130 The district court denied the defendants' discovery request
for their selective prosecution claim.131
Khan, Chapman, and Hammad each attended the Dar al Arqam
Islamic Center (the "Center") in Falls Church, Virginia. 13 2 Chapman
and Hammad led a group composed of other Center members in
paintball games.133 A group member testified that the group was set
up as a "way of doing jihad."134 "Jihad literally means a struggle,
which may range from exercising self-discipline ... to violent combat
against perceived enemies of Islam."135 The Government provided ev-
idence that Chapman and Hammad led the games to prepare mem-
bers for violent combat in foreign nations and not as exercises of mere
124. Id.
125. Id. (quoting United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 454, 467 (1996)).
126. Id.
127. 309 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. Va. 2004).
128. Id. at 795-96.
129. Id. at 796.
130. United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477, 498 (4th Cir. 2006).
131. Id. at 497-98.
132. Id. at 483.
133. "Paintball is a game that simulates military combat in which players on one team
try to eliminate players on the opposing team by shooting capsules of water-solu-
ble dye at them from air powered rifles." Id. at 483 n.2.
134. Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 803.
135. Id.
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self-discipline. 136 The Government showed that Chapman and Ham-
mad had both served in the U.S. military and led the group in "mili-
tary-type drills" and physical training. 3 7  Furthermore, the
Government showed that Chapman enforced physical punishment on
members who violated the group's rules.138 Chapman and Hammad
denied that they used the games for violent combat training and ar-
gued that the games were for recreational purposes only. 13 9
In the summer of 2001, Chapman left the paintball group and trav-
eled to Lashkar-e-Taiba ("LET") training camps in Pakistan. 140
Pakistani Muslims originally founded LET to organize violent jihad
against Russians in Afghanistan.141 However, from 1999 to 2003 LET
primarily conducted violent jihad against Indian troops in Kash-
mir.142 In fact, prior to Chapman's visit, a member of his paintball
group joined LET forces and attacked Indian troops in Kashmir.143
The Government provided evidence that LET also advocated the de-
struction of Israel and the U.S. "on its web site and elsewhere."144
The U.S. State Department officially designated LET as a terrorist
organization in December 2001.145 Although Chapman did not en-
gage in combat during his stay at the LET camp, he did participate in
weapons training and met top LET leaders.146
After the September 11th attacks, Khan and other Center mem-
bers followed Chapman's lead and decided to attend LET training
camps. 147 The Government provided evidence that Khan and other
Center members attended LET camps to train with the intent to join
Taliban forces in violent jihad against U.S. troops in Afghanistan.148
Khan attended the LET camps for six weeks and participated in mili-
tary and weapons training. 1 49 However, in November 2001 Khan
learned that U.S. forces were defeating Taliban forces in Afghanistan
and that LET would not facilitate his travel to fight against U.S.
forces. 150 Therefore, Khan left the LET camp without fighting against
U.S. forces.151
136. See id. at 804-06.
137. Id. at 805.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 803.
140. United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477, 484 (4th Cir. 2006).
141. Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 806-07.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 807-08.
144. Khan, 461 F.3d at 488.
145. Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 812.
146. Khan, 461 F.3d at 484.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 485.
150. Id.
151. Id.
[Vol. 87:538
2008] SELECTIVE PROSECUTION 553
Although Chapman and Khan never actually fought as members of
LET, the Government provided evidence that the defendants aided
LET with military operations. In 2002, Chapman and Khan helped an
LET leader purchase equipment for an unmanned aerial vehicle
("UAV") used in LET military reconnaissance missions.152 Further-
more, both Chapman and Khan housed the LET leader during his
visit to the United States in the summer of 2002.153
2. District Court Ruling
Based on the above facts, the United States charged Khan, Ham-
mad, and Chapman with conspiracy to violate the Neutrality Act,
among other charges.154 The Neutrality Act declares:
Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot or pro-
vides or prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any
military or naval expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against
the territory or dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, dis-
trict, or people with whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
1 5 5
The court convicted Chapman and Hammad under the conspiracy
charges. 15 6 The court determined that both defendants had know-
ingly organized expeditions to LET camps to attack Indian troops in
Kashmir.15 7 The United States was and still remains at peace with
India. 158 Furthermore, the court determined that both defendants
furthered the conspiracy "by training co-conspirators in combat skills
through paintball games and the acquisition of weapons, with the
knowledge that some co-conspirators had already traveled to Kashmir
and fired on Indian positions ... ."159
However, the court found insufficient evidence to convict Khan of
conspiracy to violate the Neutrality Act.160 Unlike Chapman and
Hammad, Khan did not participate in the paintball games. Further-
more, the court reasoned that Khan attended the LET training camp
to fight against U.S. forces in Afghanistan, not against Indian forces
in Kashmir.161
The U.S. also charged Khan and Chapman with actual violations of
the Neutrality Act for their attendance at the LET camps. 162 How-
152. Id. at 484.
153. Id.
154. United States v. Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d 789, 818-19 (E.D. Va. 2004).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 960 (2000). See Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 818 (providing the elements
of a Neutrality Act violation).
156. Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 818.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 818-19.
161. Id. at 819.
162. Id. at 823-24.
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ever, the court found insufficient evidence to convict either defendant
under the charges. 16 3 The U.S. provided no evidence that either de-
fendant "participated in any operations against India, or that their
intent in traveling to the LET camp was directed at waging war
against India."'16 4
3. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals: Arguments and Ruling
In their appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the defend-
ants argued that the district court erred by denying their discovery
request for their selective prosecution claim.16 5 Unfortunately, the
district court did not discuss its reasons for denying the discovery mo-
tion in its opinion. Regardless, the district court clearly did not con-
sider the selective prosecution defense at the conviction or sentencing
phases of the trial.
In their brief to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the defend-
ants argued that the Government had selectively prosecuted them be-
cause they were "Muslim in a post-9/11 world."166 In an attempt to
fulfill the discriminatory effect prong of the Armstrong discovery stan-
dard, the defendants argued that the Government failed to prosecute
other similarly situated individuals who conspired and actually vio-
lated the Neutrality Act. 167 First, the defendants argued that the
Government failed to prosecute members of the Cambodian Freedom
Fighters ("CFF") for Neutrality Act violations.168 The defendants ex-
plained that the CFF had "a long, well-documented, history of plan-
ning and carrying out attacks on the Cambodian government, a
country with whom the United States is at peace."169 More specifi-
cally, the defendants provided evidence that the Government failed to
prosecute over twenty Cambodian-American CFF members that
launched an attack against the Cambodian capital in November
2000.170 Instead of prosecuting the CFF members for the apparent
conspiracy and actual Neutrality Act violations, Government officials
allegedly invited CFF leaders to dinners with President George W.
Bush and appointed them as fundraisers for the Republican Party.171
The defendants explained that "[t]he government's only response
to the [defendants'] discovery request . . . was that the CFF was not
being prosecuted because it did not espouse hatred for the United
163. Id. at 824.
164. Id.
165. Brief of Appellants at 87-88, United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477 (4th Cir. 2006)
(Nos. 04-4519, 04-4520, 04-4521, 05-4811, 05-4818, 05-4893).
166. Id. at 88.
167. See id. at 88-90.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 88.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 89.
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States, [or] show support for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda... all of which
the government attributed to LET."172 The defendants argued that
such factors were irrelevant because "the Neutrality Act criminalizes
any acts planned and initiated in the United States to be carried out
against a country with which the United States is at peace."' 1 7 3
The defendants also cited the Government's failure to prosecute
Irish-Catholic American members of the Irish Republican Army
("IRA")174 under the Neutrality Act. The defendants argued that such
Irish-Catholic Americans "have provided arms and money to [the IRA]
for the purpose of conducting expeditions against England, a country
with which the United States is at peace." 175 Furthermore, despite
the IRA's expeditions against England, the Government failed to des-
ignate the IRA as a terrorist organization. 176
The defendants emphasized that despite CFF and IRA members'
apparent conspiracies and actual Neutrality Act violations, the Gov-
ernment had only prosecuted Muslims in the Fourth Circuit for viola-
tions of the Neutrality Act. In fact, "the Neutrality Act ha[d] only
been used in the [Fourth Circuit] within the last 100 years for the
singular purpose of convicting and attempting to convict Muslims
.... "177 The defendants apparently offered such evidence to show
discriminatory purpose under the second prong of the Armstrong test.
Therefore, the defendants argued that they provided sufficient evi-
dence of discriminatory effect and discriminatory purpose to obtain
discovery under the Armstrong discovery standard.178
In its brief to the Fourth Circuit, the Government cited the Fourth
Circuit's definition of "similarly situated" to support the district
court's denial of the defendants' discovery request. 179 The Govern-
ment argued that LET's support for the Taliban and al-Qaeda in their
war with the United States differentiated LET from the CFF and
IRA.180 Specifically, the Government argued that LET's exhibition of
hostility towards the U.S. was a "legitimate and quintessential"
prosecutorial factor that justified the defendants' prosecution. 18 1
Therefore, the Government argued that the defendants failed to show
172. Id.
173. Id. (emphasis added).
174. One of the IRA's goals was to drive the British government out of Northern Ire-
land. Id.
175. Id. at 89-90.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 90.
178. Id.
179. Brief for the United States at 86, United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477 (4th Cir.
2006) (Nos. 04-4519, 04-4520, 04-4521, 05-4811, 05-4818, 05-4893) (quoting
United States v. Olvis, 97 F.3d 739, 744 (4th Cir. 1996)).
180. Id.
181. Id.
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that the Government failed to prosecute other "similarly situated" in-
dividuals under the Neutrality Act to satisfy the first prong of the
Armstrong discovery standard.1
82
After hearing the parties' arguments, the Fourth Circuit analyzed
whether the district court erred when it denied the defendants' discov-
ery request. First, the court acknowledged the validity of the Govern-
ment's anti-terror prosecutorial strategy. The court explained that
"[t]he Executive branch has the right to focus its prosecutorial ener-
gies on alleged terrorist groups that present the most direct threat to
the United States and its interests."18 3
The court then determined whether the defendants satisfied their
evidentiary burden under the first prong of the Armstrong discovery
standard. The court employed its narrow definition of "similarly situ-
ated" and determined whether any legitimate prosecutorial factors
might have distinguished the Khan defendants from CFF and IRA
supporters.I8 4 The court sided with the Government and ruled that
LET's "direct conflict" with the United States was a legitimate factor
which differentiated LET from the CFF and IRA.185 Therefore, the
court determined that the defendants did not satisfy the discrimina-
tory effect prong of the Armstrong discovery standard.1 8 6 Accordingly,
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the defend-
ants' discovery request.1 8 7
4. The Defendants' Petition to the U.S. Supreme Court for a
Writ of Certiorari
On December 28, 2006, the defendants petitioned the U.S. Su-
preme Court for a Writ of Certiorari to review the Fourth Circuit's
decision. 1 88 The defendants again argued that they were similarly sit-
uated with CFF and IRA supporters. In light of the similarities be-
tween the groups, the defendants argued that "the [Fourth Circuit]
erred by not granting the [defendants'] request for additional discov-
ery, particularly when the information was in the sole possession of
the government and was vital to substantiate" the defendants'
claim.189 Finally, the defendants emphasized the seriousness of the
issue. "Fifty-five years of Mr. Chapman's sixty-five year sentence
182. Id.
183. Khan, 461 F.3d at 498.
184. Id. See Olvis, 97 F.3d at 744.
185. Khan, 461 F.3d at 498.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Khan v. United States 127 S. Ct. 2428 (2007) (No.
06-1116).
189. Id. at 29.
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were directly connected to his conspiracy to violate the Neutrality Act
conviction."190
The Government dismissed the validity of the defendants' claims
and again asserted that LET's open hostility toward the U.S. differen-
tiated the defendants from CFF and IRA members. 19 1 The Govern-
ment cited LET's proclamations that it would join the Taliban in
battle if the United States attacked Afghanistan to show the extent of
LET's hostility toward the U.S.192 The Government argued that "be-
cause LET presented a direct threat to the United States and its inter-
ests, [the defendants' prosecution] was a perfectly proper exercise 'of
the Government's enforcement priorities.'"193
On May 21, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the defendants'
petition for a Writ of Certiorari. 19 4 To date, the U.S. Supreme Court
has not heard a selective prosecution case involving defendants with
alleged terrorist ties. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit is the highest
court to rule on such a case. Whether other jurisdictions will adopt
the Fourth Circuit's "similarly situated" definition and application of
the Armstrong discovery standard remains uncertain.1
9 5
III. ANALYSIS
After more than three years of litigation, the U.S. Supreme Court
laid Khan to rest when it denied the defendants' petition for a Writ of
Certiorari. However, questions surrounding the selective prosecution
190. Id.
191. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 29, Khan v. United States, 127 S. Ct.
2428 (2007) (No. 06-1116).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 30 (quoting United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996)).
194. See Khan v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2428 (2007); Chapman v. United States,
127 S. Ct. 2428 (2007).
195. After the author submitted this Note for publication, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit cited Khan in United States v. Lewis, 517 F.3d 20 (1st Cir.
2008). In Lewis, the Court affirmed the district court's decision to deny the Afri-
can-American Muslim defendant's discovery motion for his selective prosecution
defense. Id. at 29. The Government alleged that the defendant had ties to terror-
ist organizations. Id. at 26. The court cited Khan to support its proposition that
"courts have upheld the government's decision to prosecute more readily when
the specter of terrorism is implicated." Id. at 28. Furthermore, the First Circuit
cited the Fourth Circuit's stringent "similarly situated" definition in Olvis and
held that whether other unprosecuted violators of federal statutes have terrorist
ties is a legitimate distinguishing factor when determining whether defendants
are "similarly situated" with such unprosecuted individuals. Id. at 27-28. Un-
like the Khan defendants, the Lewis defendants did not provide evidence that
other similarly situated non-Muslim terrorists violated the statute in question.
Therefore, it is unclear whether the First Circuit would have come to the same
decision as the Fourth Circuit in Khan. However, the First Circuit's citation of
Khan and Olvis and its failure to follow its previously articulated "objective per-
son" test to define "similarly situated" demonstrates Khan's influence.
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defense's future remain. This section analyzes Khan's impact on the
Armstrong discovery standard for selective prosecution defenses.
First, subsection A compares the stringent Armstrong discovery stan-
dard with Marshall's "nonfrivolous" standard in light of Khan. Then,
subsection B analyzes the Fourth Circuit's application of its "similarly
situated" definition in Khan in light of Lindh and Biheiri. Subsection
B also compares the Fourth Circuit and First Circuit definitions of
"similarly situated." Finally, subsection C summarizes the aftermath
of Khan. The analysis below shows that a stringent discovery stan-
dard for selective prosecution claims is necessary to keep sensitive
Government information from falling into the hands of terrorists.
However, the Fourth Circuit's narrow "similarly situated" definition
makes the Armstrong discovery standard so stringent that defendants
with substantial selective prosecution claims may be barred from ob-
taining discovery. Therefore, courts should apply the First Circuit's
more flexible "similarly situated" definition to the Armstrong discov-
ery standard.
A. Stringent v. Lenient Discovery Standard
As discussed above, some legal scholars criticized the Armstrong
court for adopting a stringent discovery standard for selective prosecu-
tion claims instead of Justice Marshall's relatively lenient "nonfrivo-
lous" standard.19 6 The Fourth Circuit denied the Khan defendants'
discovery request despite the defendants' evidence that the Govern-
ment failed to prosecute other non-Muslim individuals who conspired
and actually violated the Neutrality Act. 197 The Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion clearly demonstrates the stringent nature of the Armstrong dis-
covery standard. Under Justice Marshall's proposed "nonfrivolous"
discovery standard, the Khan defendants may have obtained discov-
ery for their selective prosecution claim.
Khan demonstrates the necessity of the more stringent Armstrong
discovery standard for selective prosecution claims in the post-9/11
world. The Armstrong court likely never envisioned the September
11th attacks.198 However, the stringent nature of the Armstrong dis-
covery standard has become a critical Government tool in the War on
Terror.19 9 In times of war, a more lenient discovery standard such as
196. See discussion supra subsection II.B.1.
197. See discussion infra subsection III.B.1.
198. The U.S. Supreme Court decided Armstrong in 1996, five years before the Sep-
tember 11th attacks in 2001. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 456.
199. Courts have relied on the stringent nature of the Armstrong discovery standard
to deny defendants with ties to terrorism from gaining access to sensitive Govern-
ment documents in a number of recent cases. See United States v. Khan, 461
F.3d 477 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Awan, 459 F. Supp. 2d 167 (E.D.N.Y.
2006); United States v. Biheiri, 341 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Va. 2004); United
States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002).
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Marshall's "nonfrivolous" standard could be disastrous. Under such a
standard, defendants with ties to terrorist organizations could poten-
tially gain access to sensitive Government documents. 2 00 Such docu-
ments could reveal the intricacies of the Government's War on Terror
investigation methods and prosecutorial strategies. 20 1 If terrorists
gained access to such information, it could be detrimental to the Gov-
ernment's war effort.
Therefore, the discovery standard for selective prosecution claims
should be stringent enough to prevent defendants with terrorist ties
from obtaining discovery through "insubstantial" selective prosecution
claims.202 Khan provides a good example of the Armstrong discovery
standard's success in meeting this objective. The Khan defendants
had direct ties to LET and indirect ties to the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
Furthermore, the defendants did not have a substantial selective pros-
ecution claim because they did not provide credible evidence that the
Government prosecuted them because they were Muslims. 20 3 Rather,
the Government likely prosecuted the defendants in light of the De-
partment of Justice's post-9/11 anti-terror prosecutorial strategy.204
If the Fourth Circuit applied a lenient discovery standard in Khan,
LET, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda may have gained access to sensitive
War on Terror documents.
B. "Similarly" or "Identically" Situated?
As discussed in the preceding section, the War on Terror demands
a stringent discovery standard for selective prosecution claims. How-
ever, the selective prosecution discovery standard must not become so
stringent that defendants with substantial claims are barred from ob-
200. In Armstrong, the court explained that "[ilf discovery is ordered, the Government
must assemble from its own files documents which might corroborate or refute
the defendant's claim." 517 U.S. at 468.
201. If defendants obtain discovery for their selective prosecution claims, it "will di-
vert prosecutors' resources and may disclose the Government's prosecutorial
strategy." Id.; see also Robert Hardaway, The Role of the Media, Law, and Na-
tional Resolve in the War on Terror, 33 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 104, 123 (2004)
("Since 9/11, a number of new legal issues have arisen" including defendants'
"discovery of sensitive information.").
202. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 ("[T]he showing necessary to obtain discovery should
itself be a significant barrier to the litigation of insubstantial claims.").
203. The defendants never expressly provided evidence of discriminatory purpose.
However, the defendants emphasized that the Government prosecuted only Mus-
lims under the Neutrality Act in the Fourth Circuit within the last one hundred
years. However, such evidence is not likely "credible evidence" of discriminatory
purpose. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (determining that statistics
showing selective prosecution of habitual offender statute did not, by themselves,
show discriminatory purpose); Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 567 ("Discriminatory
purpose cannot be inferred from a recitation of historical facts that merely pro-
vide context for criminal charges.").
204. See Ashcroft, supra note 1.
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taining discovery. The stringency of the Armstrong discovery stan-
dard may vary depending on how the court defines "similarly
situated."20 5 In Khan, the Fourth Circuit applied its "similarly situ-
ated" definition to the Armstrong discovery standard. 20 6 The first
subsection below analyzes Khan in light of Lindh and Biheiri to
demonstrate the stringency of the Fourth Circuit's "similarly situated"
definition. The second subsection compares the First and Fourth Cir-
cuit "similarly situated" definitions' impact on the Armstrong stan-
dard's stringency.
1. Difficulty Satisfying the Fourth Circuit's "Similarly Situated"
Definition
As discussed above, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia denied the Biheiri defendant's selective prosecution
claim.207 The court rejected the defense because the defendant failed
to show that the Government did not prosecute other non-Muslim in-
dividuals that "engaged in offense conduct similar to that for which"
the defendant had been indicted.2 08 Unlike the defendant in Biheiri,
the Khan defendants showed that the Government failed to prosecute
Cambodian-Americans and Irish-American Catholics who also vio-
lated the Neutrality Act. Though the Khan defendants seemed to ful-
fill this "absolute requirement,"2 09 the Fourth Circuit still determined
that the defendants failed to provide evidence of discriminatory effect.
In Lindh, the district court convicted the defendant for contribut-
ing services to the Taliban after the court denied his discovery request
for his selective prosecution defense. 210 Unlike the defendant in
Biheiri, the Lindh defendant provided some evidence that the govern-
ment failed to prosecute other non-Muslim Taliban contributors.2 11
However, the district court determined that the defendant could be
distinguished from other contributors because they contributed non-
military services to the Taliban.2 12 Under the Fourth Circuit's "simi-
larly situated" definition, the court determined that the defendant's
contribution of combatant services to the Taliban was a legitimate
prosecutorial factor which differentiated the defendant from other
contributors. 2 13 Thus, to distinguish the defendant from other
Taliban contributors, the Lindh court focused on the manner in which
the Lindh defendant violated the statute in question.
205. See discussion infra subsection III.B.2.
206. United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477, 498 (4th Cir. 2006).
207. See supra subsection II.B.3.
208. United States v. Biheiri, 341 F. Supp. 2d 593, 600 (E.D. Va. 2004).
209. Id.
210. United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 568 (E.D. Va. 2002).
211. Id. at 566 n.62; see Biheiri, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
212. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 566-67.
213. Id. at 567.
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Unlike the Lindh defendant, the Khan defendants provided evi-
dence that other non-Muslims conspired and actually violated the
Neutrality Act in a similar manner. They showed that members of the
CFF and IRA planned, supported, and even engaged in combatant ex-
peditions against countries with which the United States was at
peace. 2 14 In fact, CFF and IRA members' conspiracies and actual vio-
lations of the Neutrality Act were arguably more egregious than the
Khan defendants' conspiracy to violate the Neutrality Act. Whereas
the Khan defendants led paintball games as training for violent jihad
with knowledge that one member had attacked Indian troops,
Cambodian-American CFF members conspired and attacked the
Cambodian capital in an attempt to overthrow the Cambodian govern-
ment. Furthermore, Irish-Catholic American IRA members continu-
ously funded bombings in England. Still, the Fourth Circuit
determined that the Khan defendants failed to show that they were
similarly situated with CFF and IRA members. 215
Despite arguable success where the Biheiri and Lindh defendants
failed, the Fourth Circuit denied the defendants' discovery request be-
cause the defendants were not "similarly situated" with others who
conspired and actually violated the Neutrality Act. The court came to
its decision despite the defendants' evidence that the Government
failed to prosecute other non-Muslim individuals who conspired and
actually violated the Neutrality Act in an arguably more egregious
manner. Clearly, defendants have had difficulty satisfying the Fourth
Circuit's narrow "similarly situated" definition. As discussed above,
the Armstrong discovery standard must be stringent to prevent de-
fendants with ties to terrorism from obtaining sensitive documents or
other information.2 16 However, the Fourth Circuit's determination
that the Khan defendants failed to show credible evidence of discrimi-
natory effect may suggest that the Fourth Circuit's definition of "simi-
larly situated" is too stringent for any defendant to ever satisfy.
2. First Circuit v. Fourth Circuit: "Similarly Situated"
Definitions
As discussed above, the Fourth Circuit determined that defendants
are similarly situated with other individuals when "no distinguishable
legitimate prosecutorial factors" exist that "might justify" the prosecu-
tor's decision to prosecute the defendants and not the other individu-
als. 21 7 The Fourth Circuit has determined that such legitimate
prosecutorial factors may include: "the strength of the evidence
214. See Brief of Appellants supra note 165, at 88-90.
215. United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477, 498 (4th Cir. 2006).
216. See discussion supra section III.A.
217. United States v. Olvis, 97 F.3d 739, 744 (4th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). See
supra subsection II.B.2.
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against a particular defendant.., the amount of resources required to
convict a defendant . . .the potential impact of a prosecution on re-
lated investigations and prosecutions, and prosecutorial priorities for
addressing specific types of illegal conduct." 2 18 In Khan, the Fourth
Circuit determined that the Government's prosecutorial priority of
prosecuting defendants with ties to anti-U.S. terror groups was a le-
gitimate prosecutorial factor. 2 19
The Fourth Circuit's "similarly situated" definition seems to re-
quire that defendants be virtually identical (not merely similar) with
other unprosecuted individuals. Under the definition, defendants
must show that the prosecutor could not have differentiated the de-
fendants from other unprosecuted individuals by using legitimate
prosecutorial factors. 2 20 Whether the prosecutor actually prosecuted
the defendants in light of such factors is irrelevant under the defini-
tion. Rather, the discriminatory purpose prong of the Armstrong dis-
covery standard addresses the prosecutor's actual intent. Therefore,
as long as the prosecutor could have justified the selective prosecution
with such factors, defendants cannot satisfy the definition and fulfill
the Armstrong test's first prong. Thus, if a defendant cannot satisfy
the "similarly situated" definition, he cannot obtain discovery. If the
defendant cannot obtain discovery, his selective prosecution defense
will fail.
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit's definition of "similarly situated"
may make it easier for prosecutors to selectively prosecute defendants
for invidious purposes. Altering the facts of Khan helps illustrate this
point. Assume that the defendants in Khan were able to make a credi-
ble showing that the Government prosecuted them primarily because
they were Muslims in a post-9/11 world. A showing of such invidious
prosecution would satisfy the discriminatory purpose prong of the
Armstrong discovery standard. Applying its "similarly situated" defi-
nition, however, the Fourth Circuit would still likely deny the defend-
ants' discovery request. The court would likely determine that the
prosecutor could have differentiated the defendants from CFF and
IRA members in light of LET's conflict with the U.S. Therefore, de-
fendants would still not be able to satisfy the "similarly situated" defi-
nition to establish the discriminatory effect prong of the Armstrong
discovery standard. Without discovery, the defendants would not sat-
isfy the showing of clear evidence necessary to succeed on the merits
of their selective prosecution defense. Such a result contradicts the
218. Olvis, 97 F.3d at 744.
219. Khan, 461 F.3d at 498.
220. See Olvis, 97 F.3d at 744.
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purpose of the selective prosecution defense: the prevention of invidi-
ous, discriminatory prosecution.
22 1
In addition, ponder the following example. Assume that one Cau-
casian individual and one African-American individual sold
methamphetamine in Virginia. The Caucasian sold a considerably
larger quantity of the drug in rural Virginia, while the African-Ameri-
can sold a relatively small quantity of the drug in the City of Rich-
mond. A federal prosecutor chose to prosecute the African-American
individual and not the Caucasian individual. Assume that the Afri-
can-American can provide credible evidence that that the prosecutor
prosecuted him because of his race.
Under the Fourth Circuit's "similarly situated" definition, the fed-
eral district court would likely deny the African-American discovery
for his selective prosecution defense. The prosecutor could pay lip ser-
vice to any of the following legitimate factors that might have justified
the selective prosecution: 1) the case against the African-American
was stronger than the case against the Caucasian, 2) the prosecutor
decided to focus resources on combating methamphetamine traffic and
use in cities instead of in rural Virginia, and/or 3) the African-Ameri-
can is tied to a larger trafficking ring, while the Caucasian trafficker
ran a smaller operation. 22 2 In light of such factors that could have
justified the prosecution, the court would likely determine that the de-
fendant did not satisfy the discriminatory effect prong of the Arm-
strong discovery standard. Without the aid of discovery, the African-
American would fail on the merits of his legitimate selective prosecu-
tion defense. Therefore, the prosecutor could continue invidiously
prosecuting African-Americans under the guise of "legitimate"
prosecutorial factors that could justify the prosecutions. 22 3
In contrast, the First Circuit applies a more flexible "objective per-
son" test to determine whether individuals are similarly situated.
Whereas the Fourth Circuit's test requires that defendants be virtu-
ally identical in all material aspects, the First Circuit's test does not
require such "'[e]xact correlation."'224 Rather, the First Circuit re-
221. "[T]he decision whether to prosecute may not be based on 'an unjustifiable stan-
dard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification'.. .." United States
v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456
(1962)).
222. See Olvis, 97 F.3d at 744 (non-exclusive listing of legitimate prosecutorial
factors).
223. The author proposes that such factors should only be deemed "legitimate" if the
prosecutor can show that they actually directed his decision to prosecute. Fur-
thermore, such factors should only be relevant under the discriminatory purpose
prong of the Armstrong discovery standard as they pertain to prosecutorial
intent.
224. Tapalian v. Tusino, 377 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Barrington Cove Ltd.
P'ship v. R.I. Hous. & Mortgage Fin. Corp., 246 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2001)).
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quires that "'cases must be fair congeners."' 22 5 Furthermore, the
First Circuit's test focuses primarily on the "factual elements" of cases
to determine whether defendants are similarly situated. 22 6 Con-
versely, the Fourth Circuit focuses primarily on the existence of legiti-
mate "prosecutorial factors" that might justify the prosecutor's
selective prosecution.
22 7
Under the First Circuit's "objective person" test, the Khan defend-
ants may have satisfied the discriminatory effect prong of the Arm-
strong discovery standard. An objective person could possibly, if not
probably, determine that the Khan defendants were similarly situated
with CFF and IRA supporters. The Khan defendants organized
paintball games to train fighters in military tactics. 228 One paintball
participant traveled to Kashmir and fired on Indian troops. In con-
trast, Cambodian-American CFF supporters continuously planned
and carried out attacks on the Cambodian government. 2 29 Similarly,
Irish-American Catholics continuously supplied the IRA with arms
and funding to attack England and Northern Ireland. 23 0
At this point, some may argue that the Khan defendants' ability to
satisfy the discriminatory effect prong would have only placed ter-
rorists one step closer to discovering sensitive Government docu-
ments. Although that is a valid concern, the stringent nature of the
Armstrong discovery standard still would have prevented discovery.
While the defendants likely could have made a credible showing of
discriminatory effect, the second prong of the Armstrong discovery
standard would still have required the defendants to make a credible
showing of discriminatory purpose. The Khan defendants provided no
credible evidence that the Government prosecuted them because they
were Muslims. 23 1 Rather, the Government argued that it prosecuted
the defendants because of their ties with LET, the Taliban, and al-
Qaeda. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, such a justification
is dispositive, particularly in light of the Department of Justices' pub-
licized decision to reallocate resources to zealously prosecute members
of anti-U.S. terrorist groups.
Thus, under the First Circuit's "similarly situated" definition, the
Armstrong discovery standard still would have barred the defendants'
insubstantial selective prosecution defense. However, unlike under
the Fourth Circuit's "similarly situated" definition, the First Circuit
225. Id. (quoting Barrington Cove, 246 F.3d at 8).
226. Id. (quoting Barrington Cove, 246 F.3d at 8).
227. See Olvis, 97 F.3d at 744.
228. See supra subsection II.C.1.
229. See Brief of Appellants at 87-88, United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477 (4th Cir.
2004) (Nos. 04-4519, 04-4520, 04-4521, 05-4811, 05-4818, 05-4893).
230. Id.
231. See supra note 203.
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definition would allow discovery for defendants with substantial selec-
tive prosecution claims.
232
For example, apply the First Circuit's flexible "objective person"
test to the methamphetamine hypothetical discussed above. An objec-
tive person could determine that the African-American defendant and
unprosecuted Caucasian were similarly situated because they both
sold methamphetamine in clear violation of a federal statute. The Af-
rican-American's case is particularly persuasive because he could
show that he violated the statute in a less egregious manner by selling
a smaller quantity of the drug. Therefore, under the First Circuit's
"objective person" test, the African-American would satisfy the dis-
criminatory effect prong of the Armstrong discovery standard. Fur-
thermore, the defendant's credible showing of the prosecutor's
invidious prosecutorial intent would satisfy the discriminatory pur-
pose prong of the Armstrong discovery standard. Therefore, unlike in
the Fourth Circuit, the African-American would obtain discovery for
his substantial selective prosecution claim.
Thus, the First Circuit's "similarly situated" definition would pro-
vide for a more equitable application of the Armstrong discovery stan-
dard without compromising the standard's necessary stringency. The
more flexible test would still prevent terror suspects without credible
evidence of discriminatory purpose from obtaining access to sensitive
government documents. However, the test would also allow defend-
ants with substantial selective prosecution claims to obtain discovery
and ultimately succeed on the merits of the claims. Therefore, the
Fourth Circuit should have adopted a more flexible "similarly situ-
ated" definition in Khan to ensure the vitality of the selective prosecu-
tion defense. In the same vein, when and if the U.S. Supreme Court
decides to define "similarly situated," it should adopt the First Cir-
cuit's more flexible "objective person" test.
C. The Aftermath
The full impact of Khan on selective prosecution jurisprudence re-
mains somewhat unclear as few courts have cited Khan in the selec-
tive prosecution context. Notably, in United States v. Lewis 233 the
First Circuit cited Khan in a selective prosecution case for the proposi-
tion that "courts have upheld the government's decision to prosecute
more readily when the specter of terrorism is implicated." 234 Further-
more, the court cited the Fourth Circuit's stringent "similarly situ-
ated" definition and held that whether other unprosecuted violators of
232. By "substantial" selective prosecution claims, the author is referring to those
claims in which defendants provide credible evidence that the Government prose-
cuted them because of an arbitrary classification.
233. 517 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2008)
234. Id. at 28.
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federal statutes have terrorist ties is a legitimate distinguishing factor
when determining whether defendants are "similarly situated" with
such unprosecuted individuals. 23 5 The court then denied the selective
prosecution discovery request of an African-American Muslim defen-
dant with alleged terrorist ties because the defendant had not shown
that other non-African-American, non-Muslim defendants with terror-
ist ties had violated the statute in question.2 36
Surprisingly, the First Circuit did not mention its previously ar-
ticulated "objective person" test for determining whether individuals
are "similarly situated" in Equal Protection cases. Thus, the First Cir-
cuit's decision in Lewis demonstrates that courts may follow Khan's
lead and apply stringent definitions of "similarly situated" in the se-
lective prosecution context even when such courts have applied a more
lenient definition of "similarly situated" in other Equal Protection
cases. The First Circuit's willingness to ignore its previously articu-
lated "similarly situated" definition without discussion further demon-
strates that the U.S. Supreme Court should define "similarly situated"
in the selective prosecution context once and for all. As discussed
above, the Court should adopt the First Circuit's previously articu-
lated "objective person" test to determine whether individuals are
"similarly situated" in the selective prosecution context.
Khan also may have directly impacted Government investigations
and prosecutorial policies. Shortly after the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia decided Khan, the Government arrested
several individuals for past Neutrality Act violations.237
On June 1, 2005, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that
federal agents arrested the CFF President for Neutrality Act viola-
tions.23 8 The Department of Justice explained that federal agents ar-
rested Yasith Chhun for the role he played in CFF's attack on the
Cambodian capital in November of 2000.239 The CFF attack wounded
several Cambodian police officers and "an undetermined number of
Cambodian Freedom Fighter attackers were killed and wounded."24 0
Prior to his arrest, Chhun told a Boston Globe reporter that "[tihe FBI
comes here, they ask me questions, they don't do anything."241 Inter-
235. Id. at 27-28.
236. Id. at 27-29.
237. The district court decided Khan on March 4, 2004. See United States v. Khan,
309 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. Va. 2004).
238. U.S. Department of Justice Press Release, President of Cambodian Freedom
Fighters Arrested in Alleged Plot to Overthrow Cambodian Government (June 1,
2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ca/pressroom/pr2005/079.html.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Joshua Kurlantzick, Guerillas in our midst, BOSTON GLOBE, June 10, 2007, at El,
available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2007/06/10/guerril-
las in our midstl.
[Vol. 87:538
SELECTIVE PROSECUTION
estingly, Chhun was arrested just over a year after the Khan defend-
ants first cited CFF's members as examples of unprosecuted similarly
situated individuals who conspired and actually violated the Neutral-
ity Act.
On June 4, 2007, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that
federal agents arrested "General" Vang Pao after a six month under-
cover investigation called "Operation Tarnished Eagle."242 Vang Pao,
a 77 year-old Laotian refugee, had supported Hmong rebel fighters in
Laos since the end of the Vietnam War.2 43 The Government charged
Pao and other Laotian refugees with conspiracy to violate the Neutral-
ity Act and actual Neutrality Act violations for planning to violently
overthrow the Laotian government. 24 4 Interestingly, Pao's arrest
came just nine months after the Fourth Circuit decided Khan.
The extent of Khan's role in influencing the arrests of Chhun and
Pao is unclear. Both Chhun and Pao lived in the United States and
had long openly supported violence against nations with which the
United States was at peace. The Government's newfound interest in
prosecuting Neutrality Act violations soon after the Khan defendants
invoked their selective prosecution defense should raise at least a few
eyebrows. Although the Khan defendants ultimately lost their own
selective prosecution battle, they may have ultimately persuaded the
Government to prosecute blatant Neutrality Act violations. Again,
those worried that a more flexible definition of "similarly situated"
would allow terrorists to discover important Government documents
may rest assured. In light of the arrests of Chhun and Pao, future
defendants with ties to terrorism will have fewer, if any, obvious ex-
amples of domestic unprosecuted supporters of violence in foreign na-
tions. Therefore, such defendants will have difficulty showing that
the Government did not prosecute other "similarly situated" individu-
als under either the First Circuit's "objective person" test or the
Fourth Circuit definition of the term.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit's ruling in United States v. Khan was a partial
success. The court denied defendants with ties to anti-U.S. terrorist
organizations access to sensitive Government information. The Gov-
ernment simply cannot afford to have such information fall into the
hands of terrorists. However, in denying the discovery request, the
242. U.S. Department of Justice Press Release, "Operation Tarnished Eagle" Thwarts
Plot to Overthrow the Government of Laos (June 4, 2007), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/usao/cae/press-releases/docs/2007/06-04-07JackPressRls.pdf.
243. Kurlantzick, supra note 241, at El.
244. U.S. Department of Justice Press Release, "Operation Tarnished Eagle" Thwarts
Plot to Overthrow the Government of Laos, (June 4, 2007), available at http:l
www.usdoj.gov/usao/cae/press-releases/docs/2007/06-04-07JackPressRls.pdf.
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Fourth Circuit erred by applying its narrow "similarly situated" defi-
nition to the Armstrong discovery standard. The court could have ap-
plied the First Circuit's more flexible and equitable "objective person"
test to the Armstrong discovery standard and still denied the defend-
ants' discovery request.
The selective prosecution defense is a necessary check on
prosecutorial power. Though courts should generally defer to prosecu-
tors' discretion, they must not forget that absolute power corrupts ab-
solutely. For over one hundred and twenty years, the U.S. Supreme
Court has deferred to prosecutorial discretion and narrowed the selec-
tive prosecution defense. Now, selective prosecution is in danger of
becoming a futile defense. The vitality of the defense depends on the
U.S. Supreme Court's definition of "similarly situated." If the Court
adopts the Fourth Circuit's narrow definition, the defense may become
futile as defendants with substantial selective prosecution claims may
be barred from obtaining discovery. However, if the Court adopts the
First Circuit's more flexible "objective person" test to define "similarly
situated," the selective prosecution defense will continue to check
prosecutorial power by allowing defendants with substantial selective
prosecution claims to obtain discovery. Until the Court actually
adopts a definition, however, the vitality of the defense hangs in the
balance.
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